Back to the future - revival of Communist Party power in Hungary

First Lithuania, then Poland, now Hungary. What explains the ability of onetime Communist Parties to return to power, just a few years after being swept out?

The standard answer is that the hard economic changes in Hungary - as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe - have divided the population into "winners" and "losers," with the latter outnumbering the former. Though true to a point, this argument fails to account for the continuing popularity of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic, where growth rates are no speedier, or for the fact that unemployment and inflation (two of the downsides of reform most frequently mentioned) had been falling steadily in Hungary for months. How is it, then, that one government appears able to benefit from being associated with a free-market economy while the other does not?

In part this can be explained by the failure of the defeated Hungarian Democratic Forum to identify itself with these changes in simple, straightforward terms. Neither Hungary's first democratically chosen prime minister since the war, Jozsef Antall (who died in December), nor his successor had Klaus's gift for the language of popular capitalism.

On the other hand, they also inherited a much more complex legacy from the previous era. For most Hungarians remember the 1970s and '80s quite fondly. Certainly the heavily subsidized years of "goulash Communism" were without significant shortages. But they were also lacking in self-reliance and self-respect, two qualities essential to the building of a meritocratic society. Furthermore, they were predicated on forced amnesia concerning the events of 1956.

That relatively few Hungarians today seem troubled by the role that Gyula Horn, the leader of the victorious Socialist Party, played in suppressing the 1956 uprising (a role he has never denied) suggests that this operation on the national memory was remarkably successful. Even more remarkable is that when the government tried to remind people of this slice of history through the broadcast media, it was reproached for "negative campaigning" and "mudslinging."

This is a familiar story. Whenever during the last few years the Antall administration attempted to undo some of the most pernicious consequences of the Communist period, it met a loud chorus of disapproval from the majority of the country's intelligentsia. The image was built up (and readily received in the West) of a government constituted entirely of backward-looking amateurs. It was alleged, moreover, that they were responsible for the growth of a Far Right - even though no such party has made it into the new parliament.

What was needed, went the refrain, was modernization and professionalism. Step forward the Socialists with their reputation for "expertise" and attitude of weary condescension toward the outgoing team. "Let the experts govern," was the chief slogan of their highly effective campaign.

How far is the Socialists' reputation justified? After all, $20 billion of national debt - the other legacy of "goulash Communism" - doesn't sound like much to boast about. The more sophisticated leaders of the party will agree, arguing that they were the ones who at the end of the 1980s became internationally celebrated for initiating reforms intended to reduce this burden.

It is certainly true that the last Communist government before the 1990 elections was less ideological and more technocratic than its predecessors. True, too, that its finance minister, Laszlo Bekesi (who now stands a good chance of returning to his old job), is no fan of ruinous welfare programs.

The problem is that the position of such figures inside the party is much weaker now than it was then. Four years ago, the Socialists had no electoral pact with the country's main trade-union federation. Now the chairman of this body (which has managed to retain nearly all its old assets), Sandor Nagy, has entered parliament in second place on the party's nationalist list. Surely the members of these unions will expect something in return for their support? If so, and in view of the dashes that have already occurred between Nagy and Bekesi over the party's economic program, it would be no surprise to see precisely the kind of government crisis blow up as recently left Poland without a finance minister for three months.

Still, it would be wrong to portray the Socialists as primarily the party of the disadvantaged. Often overlooked by foreign commentators is the wealth accumulated by many members of the old nomenklatura during the last decade of Communist rule. Having once used their political positions for economic gain (typically through privatization deals which were pure asset-stripping), this elite - the so-called Red bourgeoisie - now backs the Socialist Party in order to defend its privileges. Well placed inside many of Hungary's best-known companies, it is certainly interested in financial discipline. What it is not interested in is sharing this wealth with outsiders. The outcome will be a further entrenching of the Socialist Party's power-base on the one hand, matched by rising social frustration among those denied the chance to better their circumstances on the other.